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ARTICLES
TWO TOO MANY:
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF
WARRANTIES UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
JENNIFER CAMERO†
INTRODUCTION
Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., traditionally known for its safe and
reliable vehicles, recently shocked the world with multiple
voluntary recalls, affecting an astonishing number of vehicles. In
November 2009, Toyota recalled 3.8 million vehicles due to
unintended acceleration1 and, only a few months later, recalled
an additional 2.3 million vehicles, also due to unintended
acceleration.2 Not even one year after the first recall, Toyota
issued yet another recall of approximately 740,000 vehicles, this
time due to leaking brake fluid.3
†
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of Professional Practice at Louisiana State University Law Center. The author
would like to thank the law faculty at Louisiana State University, especially Melissa
Lonegrass, Scott Sullivan, Ken Levy, Christina Sautter and Bill Corbett, for their
insightful comments. The author also would like to thank Mark Camero for his
patience and support as well as his constructive criticism on the many drafts of this
article.
1
Marc Stern, Toyota Recall: Toyota Broadens Recall to 3.8 Million Cars,
Trucks; To Fix Gas Pedal, Rugs, CAR NEWS BREAK (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.
carnewsbreak.com/news/1039027_toyota-recall-toyota-broadens-recall-to-3-8-millioncars-trucks-to-fix-gas-pedal-rugs.
2
See Press Release, Toyota Motor Sales, Toyota Files Voluntary Safety Recall
on Select Toyota Division Vehicles for Sticking Accelerator Pedal (Jan. 21, 2010),
available at http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1844.
3
Press Release, Toyota Motor Sales, Toyota Announces Intent To Voluntarily
Recall Certain Toyota Avalon and Highlander, and Lexus GS300, IS250, and IS350
Vehicles To Replace a Brake Master Cylinder Seal (Oct. 20, 2010), available
at http://pressroom.toyota.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=2113; Nicole Wilson,
Toyota Recall October 2010–Potential Brake Fluid Leak Involves 740,000 Vehicles,
BEST SYNDICATION (Oct. 21, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.bestsyndication.com/
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Given the significant number of affected vehicles, Toyota
should expect to see numerous injuries and damages caused by
such defects. In one case, a California Highway Patrol Officer
was driving a Lexus, Toyota’s luxury brand, with three
passengers when the car began accelerating automatically.4 The
vehicle reached a speed of 120 miles per hour and then collided
into another vehicle, killing all four passengers in the Lexus and
severely damaging the other vehicle.5
Although the family of the deceased officer sued Toyota for
negligence,6 the family also could have sued under other product
liability theories, specifically breach of warranty, as the car was
not fit for its ordinary purpose.7 In fact, thus far, most other
suits filed against Toyota relating to the recalls allege both
negligence and breach of warranty.8 Ultimately, the legal claims
were irrelevant to the family of the officer because Toyota quickly
settled the matter for ten million dollars.9 But what about the
owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision? Does he have
?q=20101021_toyota_recall_october_2010_vehicle_model_year_list_announced_brake
_repair_needed.htm;
4
See Stern, supra note 1.
5
See id.
6
See Complaint for Damages at 6–7, Saylor v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 37-201000086718-CU-PL-CTL, 2010 WL 732013 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2010).
7
Product liability is a blend of contract law and tort law concepts. See Jay M.
Feinman, Implied Warranty, Products Liability, and the Boundary Between Contract
and Tort, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 469, 477 (1997). In fact, product liability encompasses
four different causes of actions: (i) negligence; (ii) strict liability; (iii) breach of
contract; and (iv) breach of implied warranty. See Alex Devience, Jr., The Developing
Line Between Warranty and Tort Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Does 2-318 Make a Difference?, 2 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 295, 295–96 (1990). Often, a
plaintiff will sue on all four actions with the hope of recovering under at least one.
8
See, e.g., Amended Economic Loss Master Consolidated Complaint at 219–26,
In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 8:10ML2151
JVS), 2010 WL 4257075 (claiming breach of express warranty and breach of implied
warranty of merchantability); Complaint at 10–12, Welch v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., No. 010CV04276, 2010 WL 4222883 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2010) (claiming
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty); Complaint for Damages at 39–
44, Hatzman v. Toyota Motor N. Am., Inc., No. 10CV06282, 2010 WL 3779523 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 2010) (claiming negligence, strict products liability, and breach of
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose);
Complaint for Damages 30–33, Lebson v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., No.
10CV6081, 2010 WL 3299128 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010) (claiming strict product
liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and negligence).
9
See Martha Neil, Judge Nixes Secrecy Pact in High-Profile Fatal Toyota Crash
Settlement; Automaker Paid $10M, AM. BAR ASS’N JOURNAL (Dec. 23, 2010,
5:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/ipad/article/judge_nixes_secrecy_pact_in_highprofile_toyota_crash_settlement_automaker_/.
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the ability to sue Toyota for breach of warranty to recover the
cost of the damage caused to his vehicle by the allegedly defective
Lexus?
Historically, the answer to the preceding question was a
resounding no. Common law traditionally required a contractual
relationship between Toyota and the injured parties, allowing
only the purchaser of the vehicle to sue a manufacturer for
breach of warranty.10 In the 1950s, due to a gradual shift in
public policy aimed at protecting consumers, section 2-318 was
added to the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to allow certain
third parties to sue a manufacturer or other seller—such as a
distributor or retailer—for breach of warranty despite the
absence of a contractual relationship.11
Unlike the majority of the UCC, which provides one
provision per section, the drafters of section 2-318 offer three
alternatives from which states’ legislatures can choose to enact.12
The alternatives cover a wide spectrum of third parties excluded
from the privity requirement in breach of warranty suits. At one
end of the spectrum, only the purchaser’s family members with
personal injury can maintain a breach of warranty claim. At the
other end, any reasonably foreseeable party with any reasonable
damage can sue a manufacturer or other seller for breach of
warranty.13
Not only do the three alternatives produce vastly different
outcomes from each other, but the common law among the states
that adopted the same alternative also vastly differs. These
variations result in the same fact pattern often leading to
different outcomes, depending on the applicable alternative and
how the case law developed in that jurisdiction. The end result is
a provision that not only defeats the UCC’s fundamental

10
1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 2-318:1 (Frederick H. Miller ed., 2010); R. D. Hursh, Annotation, Privity of
Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based on Theory Other than Negligence,
Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged To Have Caused Injury, 75
A.L.R.2d 39, § 3 (1961) (citing Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 288 P.2d 75 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1955); Tralli v. Triple X Stores, Inc., 112 A.2d 507, 509 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1954); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 177 A. 656, 659 (N.H. 1935)).
11
1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10.
12
William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by NonPrivity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions that Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215, 1229 (1993).
13
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010).
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purposes of simplicity and uniformity, but also creates
unpredictable seller liability and generates unnecessary battles
over applicable state law.
This Article surveys and analyzes the current version of
section 2-318 and suggests improvements so that section 2-318
produces more uniform and equitable results that better
facilitate interstate commerce in today’s complex commercial
environment. Part I discusses the historical genesis of section 2318, specifically the common law concept of privity and its
progression to the current version of section 2-318. Part II
expounds upon certain issues with section 2-318 as currently
drafted, which include lack of uniformity and lack of remedy for a
valid breach of warranty claim. Part III establishes how the
courts have begun eroding the concept of privity in spite of
the language of section 2-318, thus eliminating the need for
alternatives. Part IV proposes improvements to section 2-318
in accordance with current case law and public policy aimed
at protecting consumers. Finally, Part V demonstrates that
the states would adopt the proposed provision given today’s
consumer-centric society.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF UCC SECTION 2-318

Privity is the legal relationship between the parties to a
contract or transaction.14 Historically, a plaintiff needed to be in
privity with the defendant in order to maintain a cause of
action.15 The 1842 English case of Winterbottom v. Wright is the
first case to decide that lack of privity is a defense to a claim.16
In Winterbottom, the Postmaster General had purchased mail
coaches from one company, but then hired drivers for the coaches
from another company. One such driver sued the supplier of the
coaches for breach of contract for injuries caused by the tipping of
the coach.17 The court barred the claim because the driver was
not a party to the contract between the Postmaster General and
the supplier of the coach, reasoning that “[u]nless we confine the

14
15
16
17

Hartley v. Phillips, 47 A. 929, 935 (Pa. 1901).
Id.
Stallworth, supra note 12, at 1225.
See Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ct.).
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operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into
them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I
can see no limit, would ensue.”18
After Winterbottom, American courts began to adopt the
concept of privity, applying it to both tort law and contract law
claims.19 Over time, courts slowly eroded the need for privity
with respect to common law tort claims,20 leaving privity
applicable only to contract law claims. Courts eventually began
to recognize the need for exceptions to privity in the context of
contract law claims in order to protect consumers from certain
products. Initially, courts removed the need for privity in claims
involving food and beverage, placing the public welfare above the
legal necessity for privity.21 Soon after, courts removed the need
for privity in claims involving inherently dangerous products
under a similar public policy rationale.22 A few progressive

18
Id. at 406; William Prosser, noted torts scholar, suggested that the rationale
for privity was to support the Industrial Revolution since less manufacturer liability
encourages industry to further advance product technology. Steven Bonanno,
Privity, Products Liability, and UCC Warranties: A Retrospect of and Prospects for
Illinois Commercial Code § 2-318, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1991).
19
1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10.
20
Id. The end of privity in tort cases culminated with Justice Cardozo’s famed
opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In
MacPherson, Buick sold an automobile to a dealer, who in turn sold it to Mr.
MacPherson. Id. at 384. While driving the automobile, the car suddenly collapsed,
throwing Mr. MacPherson from the car. Id. at 384–85. In ruling for MacPherson,
Judge Cardozo stated that of “there is added knowledge that the thing will be used
by persons other than the purchaser . . . irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of
this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.” Id. at 389. In this case,
Buick sold it to a dealer, so Buick knew it would be sold to an end user. Id. at 391.
Also, the car sat three people and not just one, indicating Buick was well aware that
more than one person could be in the vehicle at any time. Id.
21
See, e.g., Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 47 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)
(citing Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382, 392 (Iowa 1920); Boyd v. Coca
Cola Bottling Works, 177 S.W. 80, 81 (Tenn. 1915)); Davis, 176 N.W. at 392 (“We are
of [the] opinion that the duty of a manufacturer to see to it that food products put
out by him are wholesome, and the implied warranty that such products are fit for
use runs with the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of the consumer, rather than
to the wholesaler or retailer, and that the question of privity of contract in sales is
not controlling, and does not apply in such a case.”); Boyd, 177 S.W. at 81 (“Upon
whatever ground the liability of such a manufacturer to the ultimate consumer is
placed, the result is eminently satisfactory, conducive to the public welfare, and one
which we approve.”); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 314 P.2d 421, 422 (Wash.
1957) (explaining that liability of manufacturers for breach of warranties related to
food and beverage is the exception to the general rule of privity).
22
See, e.g., Lichina v. Futura Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D. Colo. 1966) (“[T]his
Court recognize[s] the rapidly-expanding notion that privity of contract should not
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courts took the exceptions one step further and even allowed a
non-purchaser to maintain a cause of action where the individual
was injured, regardless of the nature of the product; however, at
that time, extending the exceptions to privity this far was
unusual.23 Ultimately, despite some relaxation by courts of the
requirement of privity for contract law claims, the majority of
courts still grasped onto the historical concept of privity: Only
the purchaser of the product has privity and is therefore the only
party able to sue a manufacturer or other seller for breach of
warranty.24
The first codification of exceptions to the privity requirement
for warranty claims appeared in section 43 of the Uniform
Revised Sales Act,25 which extended warranty protection to
anyone that was reasonably expected to use or be affected by the

be a condition of recovery on a breach of warranty theory, at least where the product
causing the injury creates a high degree of hazard to third persons.”); Chapman v.
Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 118 (D. Haw. 1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962)
(“This court can see no rational basis for distinguishing between a public policy
which favors protection of consumers of unwholesome and dangerous food and one
which favors protection of a consumer injured by dangerously flammable clothing.”);
Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844, 848 (Wash. 1965) (“[A] manufacturer of
dynamite is liable to the ultimate user for breach of implied warranty of fitness
without regard to privity of contract.”).
23
See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 99–100 (N.J.
1960) (allowing the injured wife of the purchaser of a vehicle to sue the
manufacturer for breach of warranty despite no privity of contract).
24
In one example, a mother purchased a washing machine from Sears. Dewar v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1944). Exposed
moving parts of the washing machine severely injured her infant son. Id. The son
sued Sears on a breach of warranty claim for his injuries, alleging that the
employees of Sears represented that the washing machine had no defective parts
and no unguarded moving parts. Id. He also sued Sears on a negligence claim,
asserting that Sears negligently represented that the machine did not have any
exposed moving parts. Id. The court dismissed the breach of warranty claim for lack
of privity of contract with Sears because the son did not purchase the washing
machine. Id. at 656. Sears’s only duty was to the purchaser of the washing machine,
the mother. See id. The court also dismissed the negligence claim for insufficiency,
leaving the injured infant without a cause of action against Sears. Id. at 656–57. The
court dismissed the negligence claim for insufficiency because the complaint failed to
allege that Sears owed a duty of care to the infant. Id. at 657.
25
The Uniform Sales Act was drafted in 1906 and adopted by thirty-four states
over the thirty-five years following its adoption. Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to
Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 787, 787 (2001). After a
failed attempt to federalize sales law, a Uniform Revised Sales Act was proposed to
quiet critics of the Uniform Sales Act. See id. at 787–88.
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product.26 The drafters of section 43 desired not only to diminish
the severe results that would occur due to the privity
requirement but also to reflect the judicial erosion of the common
law privity requirements.27
In the 1950s, Article 2 of the UCC replaced the proposed
Uniform Revised Sales Act in order to modernize and streamline
commercial law.28 The original version of section 2-318, which
replaced section 43, was more limited than section 43 with
respect to third-party exclusions from the privity requirement.29
Unlike the section it replaced, section 2-318 only extended
warranty protection to an individual with personal injury who
was in the family or household of the initial purchaser so long as
it was reasonable to expect that the individual would use,
consume, or be affected by the product.30 Many states, however,
chose not to adopt this provision because they disagreed on the
amount of liability that should rest with a manufacturer or other
seller for a breach of warranty claim by a non-purchaser.31 The
California legislature, for example, refused to adopt section 2318, believing that it was “a step backward” from section 43.32

26
1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10. Section 43 stated: “A warranty extends
to any natural person whose relationship to the buyer is such as to make it
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person or property by breach of the warranty.” Id.
27
Id. (describing section 43 as reflecting hostility “to the concept of privity as a
limitation on warranty relief” and “a sympathy for consumers and a feeling that the
cost of product liability should be spread among all users of the product in the form
of higher prices”); cf. Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Privity of Contract in UCC
Warranty Cases, THE LAWYER’S BRIEF, Dec. 15, 2008, at 1 (underscoring the UCC
drafters’ desire to create exceptions to the privity defense).
28
Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s
Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 436 (1997) (“The
codification of commercial law sprung out of dissatisfaction with the uniform
statutes of the previous fifty years.”); Arthur Linton Corbin, The Uniform
Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 834–35 (1950)
(“But after the 50 years through which we have just lived, the old rules need some
replacement, the old words need changing, the analysis and organization can be
improved, the remedies can be made more effective.”).
29
1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note 10.
30
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010).
31
Arlie R. Nogay, Comment, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the
UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular
Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
873, 884 (1986).
32
1 HAWKLAND & RUSCH, supra note10, at § 2-318.
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Overall, the success of the original section 2-318 is questionable,
as ten states chose not to adopt it and many other states had
proposals for amendments.33
As a result of this schism, the drafters of the UCC added two
alternatives to the section in 196634 “to allow the individual
states . . . to reflect the philosophies in the treatment of
‘warranty’ protections which may be thought ‘proper.’ ”35 The
drafters reasoned that providing a limited number of options to
the states could limit the number of variations among the
states.36
Section 2-318 has not changed much since the revision in
1966. The current version of section 2-318 retains the three
alternatives, with Alternative A37 being the 1962 version and
Alternatives B and C being the alternatives that the drafters
added in 1966.38 At first glance, the language of each alternative

33

Id.
Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp., 726 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
35
McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 921 (Me. 1973).
36
John L. Amabile & John C. Amabile, Warranties, in AM. BAR ASS’N, BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 101:57 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d
ed. 2011).
37
For a detailed discussion on Alternative A, see Stallworth, supra note 12, at
1229–30.
38
Alternative A to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who is in the family or
household of the immediate buyer or the remote purchaser or who is a guest
in the home of either if it is reasonable to expect that the person may use,
consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any individual who may reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C to subsection (2). A seller’s warranty to an immediate
buyer, whether express or implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an
immediate buyer, or a seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under
Section 2-313A or 2-313B extends to any person that may reasonably be
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and that is injured by
breach of the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the
34
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appears similar, but the results of each alternative are not. Who
is excluded from the privity requirement and what type of
damages that party can seek from a manufacturer or other seller
vary dramatically among the three alternatives, as demonstrated
by the following chart.
Alternative

A

B

C

Parties Excepted
from the Privity
Requirement
Family member,
household member or
guest in the home of
the original purchaser
Anyone reasonably
expected to use,
consume or be affected
by the product
Anyone reasonably
expected to use,
consume or be affected
by the product

Damages
Recoverable
Personal Injury

Personal Injury

Personal Injury or
Property Damage

Comparing the three alternatives, Alternative A is the most
limited in terms of who is excluded from the privity requirement
for a breach of warranty claim. Specifically, it only exempts
individuals who are household or family members of the
purchaser or who are household guests.39 Alternative A is also
the most limited in terms of what damages a plaintiff can seek
for breach of warranty because it requires that a plaintiff suffer
personal injury.40 Alternative B expands coverage of Alternative

person of an individual to whom the warranty, remedial promise, or
obligation extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2010) (emphasis added).
39
Id.
40
In one example of Alternative A, an individual in Illinois purchased a Toyota
from a dealer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toyota Motor Mfg. N. Am., Inc., No. 09 C 1517,
2009 WL 3147315, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009). The car ignited while parked in
the garage with the engine off, demolishing itself and another car and causing
$600,000 in damages to the individual’s residence. Id. The individual had
homeowner’s insurance with Allstate, which reimbursed him for the loss and then
sued Toyota for breach of warranty. Id. The court dismissed the case because
Allstate did not meet the requirements of Alternative A—adopted by Illinois—as
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A to include any party reasonably expected to use, consume, or be
affected by the good.41 While Alternative B expands the class of
people who can sue for breach of warranty beyond the narrow
category recognized in Alternative A, it retains Alternative A’s
requirement of personal injury.42
Alternative C maintains
Alternative B’s plaintiff pool, but it expands the types of damages
recoverable for breach of warranty to all damages, including
property and economic damage.43 The policy behind providing
such a broad exception to the privity requirement is to prohibit
manufacturers from binding consumers to contracts to which
they are not parties.44
Unexpectedly,45 the distribution of the alternatives among
the states is uneven—with a majority of states adopting
Alternative A,46 six states adopting Alternative B,47 and eight
states adopting Alternative C.48 Even with three alternatives

Allstate was not a family member and did not seek damages for personal injury. Id.
at *2.
41
U.C.C. § 2-318.
42
In one example of Alternative B, a machine crushed the foot of a man while at
work, so he sued the manufacturer of the machine for breach of warranty. Cereo v.
Takigawa Kogyo Co., Ltd., 252 A.D.2d 963, 963, 676 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (4th Dep’t
1998). The court allowed the claim under New York law—Alternative B—as
employees are specifically part of the plaintiff class covered by Alternative B, and
the employee had a personal injury. Id. at 964, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
43
In one case, an aerial photography business sued the maker of a
remanufactured aircraft engine for breach of warranty. Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp.,
551 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D.S.D. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 714 F.2d 862 (8th Cir.
1983). The plaintiff sought only economic losses, including labor costs to
troubleshoot and repair the engine, costs to purchase and install a replacement
engine, and lost profits. Id. at 775–76. The manufacturer sought dismissal of the
claim for lack of privity because the plaintiff purchased the engine through a
distributor. Id. at 777. The court refused to dismiss the claim on the grounds that
the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable user, and the language of the statute
specifically allows purely economic losses. Id. at 778.
44
GKW Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., No. 91-15791, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
16238, at *5–6 (9th Cir. July 8, 1992).
45
If the states were truly divided over the appropriate exceptions to privity, the
number of states adopting each alternative should be more evenly divided.
46
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Shawn M.
Bates & Deborah J. Karakowsky, U.C.C. Section 2-318: The ABCs of Defense, COM.
& BUS. LITIG., Summer 2009, at 1, 17.
47
Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont. Id.
48
Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming. Id.
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from which to choose, eight states decided not to enact any of the
three alternatives.49
Out of those eight states, California,
Louisiana, and Texas chose not to adopt any statute regarding
privity.50 The remaining five states—Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia—adopted similar
provisions.51 Like Alternative C, these states allow a party to sue
despite no privity of contract as long as the plaintiff was a person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods, regardless of whether the damages were personal
injury or economic loss.52 The laws in these states differ from
Alternative C in that their statutes explicitly allow a purchaser
to sue any seller in the distribution chain whereas Alternative C
remains silent on that issue.53 Because courts in almost every
state have developed the common law to permit the purchaser to

49
California, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Texas, and Virginia. Id. Louisiana has adopted every article of the UCC except
Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC. Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code—Process and Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125, 125 n.1 (1999); Robert
E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1032 n.76 (2002).
50
CAL. COM. CODE § 2318 (West 2011); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318
(West 2011).
51
Bates & Karakowsky, supra note 46.
52
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff
and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer,
seller or supplier of goods [to recover damages] for breach of warranty . . . if the
plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier might reasonably
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall
be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a
person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382A:2-318 (2011) (“Lack of privity shall not be a defense in any action brought against
the manufacturer, seller or supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of
warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer, seller or supplier
might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2-318 (West 2010) (“A seller’s or a manufacturer’s or a
packer’s warranty . . . extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.”);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (West 2011) (“Lack of privity between plaintiff and
defendant shall be no defense in any action brought against the manufacturer or
seller of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty . . . if the plaintiff was a
person whom the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods . . . .”).
53
E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6A-2318 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (West 2011).
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sue any party in the distribution chain,54 a breach of warranty
claim by a third party litigated in these five states generally will
have the same outcome as if the matter had been litigated in a
state that adopted Alternative C. Therefore, for purposes of this
article, these five states are grouped together with Alternative C
states.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH UCC SECTION 2-318
As currently drafted, section 2-318 creates two fundamental
problems. First, section 2-318 produces a lack of uniformity
among the states that defeats the UCC’s purpose, generates
unpredictable seller liability, and creates unnecessary disputes
over applicable law. Second, section 2-318 removes remedies for
injured plaintiffs that otherwise are available under the UCC.
A.

Non-Uniformity

Because of the choice of three alternatives, a lack of
uniformity exists among the states. For example, in Allstate
Insurance v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
discussed above, Allstate was the insurer of a home in Illinois
that burned down due to a car fire in the garage.55 Allstate sued
the manufacturer of the car for breach of warranty to recover the
insurance proceeds that it paid to the insured.56 The court
dismissed Allstate’s breach of warranty claim: Illinois is an
Alternative A state and Allstate was neither a family member of
the purchaser nor did it suffer any personal injuries.57 In that
case, Allstate’s sole damage was monetary loss due to the
property damage caused by the fire.58 Assuming Illinois had
instead adopted Alternative B, the results would have been the
same. However, if Illinois had adopted Alternative C, Allstate

54

See, e.g., Bishop v. Faroy Sales, 336 So. 2d 1340, 1344–45 (Ala. 1976);
Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 958–59 (Ind. 2005); Groppel Co.
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985).
55
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toyota Motor Mfg. N. Am., Inc., No. 09 C 1517, 2009 WL
3147315, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009).
56
Id.
57
Id. at *2.
58
Id. at *1–2.
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could have maintained the suit because an insurance company
would be a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff and having a personal
injury would not be a necessary requirement.59
In the end, the result of a case depends upon the alternative
that the applicable state chose to enact. This inconsistency:
(1) defeats the purpose of the UCC; (2) creates unpredictable
liability for manufacturers; and (3) generates unnecessary battles
over applicable state law.
First, the UCC clearly and conspicuously sets forth its
purpose and policy, which is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize
the law governing commercial transactions . . . [and] to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.”60
The
underlying objective of this purpose is to facilitate and
streamline interstate commerce by minimizing uncertainty and
unpredictability in commercial transactions.61
Overall, UCC Article 2 has made vast improvements in the
efficiency and outcome of commercial transactions. However,
section 2-318 is an exception to that accomplishment. Not only
are the states divided among the three alternatives, but the
states that have adopted the same alternative often interpret
that alternative differently.62 Conceivably, every state could
have a different outcome on the same fact pattern. The result is
a section of the UCC that is complex, inconsistent, and hinders
the ease of interstate commerce.
Second, the variation in the outcome of the alternatives and
the discrepancy in the common law interpretation of the
alternatives prevent a manufacturer from accurately estimating
its liability for warranty and warranty-related claims.
A

59

See, e.g., Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Minn.

1976).
60
U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1), (3) (2010); see U.C.C. General Comment of National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute (“Uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main
objectives of this Code; and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial
uniformity of construction.”).
61
See Dom Calabrese et al., Karl Llewellyn’s Letters to Emma Cortsvet Llewellyn
from the Fall 1941 Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 27 CONN. L. REV. 523, 526–27 (1995) (noting that the UCC helped to
alleviate the “uncertainty that might have impeded the post-World War II economic
upswing” at a time when interstate commerce was growing rapidly); see also Gregory
E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 546–47 (2000).
62
See infra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
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manufacturer uses its estimate of warranty liability to determine
the type and amount of insurance it holds and the amount it
spends on product safety.63 An inaccurate estimate leads to
overspending or underspending on insurance and product safety
measures, which result in economic inefficiency through the
failure to maximize profits.
Because a certain amount of uncertainty always exists
with product liability, manufacturers utilize insurance as a
risk-management technique to minimize or eliminate that
uncertainty.64 If a manufacturer cannot accurately estimate its
liability, it will purchase either too much or too little insurance.65
Too much insurance results in a waste of resources that could be
better spent elsewhere, such as research and development or
product safety. Too little insurance may not only be illegal66 but
may also require the manufacturer to dip into cash reserves to
compensate injured plaintiffs. If the manufacturer does not have
enough cash reserves to cover the judgment, the injured plaintiffs
may go uncompensated and the manufacturer may need to
declare bankruptcy in order to cope with the liability.67
Additionally, a manufacturer determines how much money it
spends on product safety by comparing two costs: (1) the actual
cost to make the product safer through the design and
manufacturing processes; and (2) the implicit price of damages
the product causes to consumers and property.68 To maximize its

63

See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (6th ed. 2012).
See id. at 51.
65
See id.
66
Most states require a corporation to maintain adequate capitalization,
meaning that the corporation must have enough assets to cover the liabilities of the
corporation. Too little insurance is one way a corporation could be inadequately
capitalized. See, e.g., David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 371, 374–75 (1981); William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder
Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 837, 868–69 (1982).
67
See, e.g., John Seewer, Owens Corning Files for Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Oct.
5, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20001005/aponline124417_
000.htm (“Owens Corning filed for bankruptcy protection . . . to help it cope with
asbestos-related lawsuits that could eventually cost the company $7 billion.”); Tom
Hals, Asbestos Claims Lead RPM Int’l Units to Bankruptcy, REUTERS, June 1, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0112012320100601 (“Two subsidiaries of RPM
International . . . filed for bankruptcy . . . to resolve thousands of asbestos-related
lawsuits . . . .”).
68
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63.
64
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profits, which is the ultimate goal of any for-profit corporation,69
a manufacturer will invest in safety precautions only until the
cost of additional precautions equals the cost of additional
accidents.70 In other words, a manufacturer will balance its
expected gains and expected losses.71
If the estimate of
additional accidents—which includes the estimate of warranty
liability—is incorrect, then a manufacturer’s expected loss will be
incorrect. Consequently, the manufacturer either will overspend
or underspend on safety precautions, resulting in the failure to
maximize profits.
The third result of the inconsistency among jurisdictions is
battles over applicable law, which leads to a waste of judicial
resources.72 Because of the varying outcomes of each alternative,
it often is beneficial for a litigant to apply certain states’
section 2-318 over other states’ provision.
This result
incentivizes the parties to fight over the applicable law.
To further complicate this issue, the UCC requires
“appropriate relations” with the state in order to apply a specific
state’s law.73 Not only does the UCC fail to define “appropriate
relations,” it explicitly states that courts should determine the
meaning.74 Not surprisingly, not all courts define “appropriate
relations” the same way.
The most common interpretation—referred to by a variety of
names such as “center of gravity,” “interest analysis,” and “most
significant relationship,”—interprets “appropriate relations” to
require a significant relationship between the state and the
warranty claim.75
Unfortunately, courts assign varying
definitions to “significant relationship.” Some courts determine
significant relationship to mean where the product was sold,
69
Id. at 12. One of the main assumptions of economics is that corporations act
rationally. Id. Because “rationality requires maximization,” a rationale corporation,
therefore, would act to maximize profits. Id.
70
Id. at 3.
71
Id. at 250.
72
For a general discussion on conflict of laws, see generally WILLIAM M.
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2002). For a bibliography of various conflict of laws articles, see
Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict of Laws Bibliography: U.S. Sources, 2006–2007, 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 321 (2008).
73
U.C.C. § 1-301 cmt. 3 (2010).
74
Id. § 1-301.
75
See Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging Co.), 839
F.2d 203, 206–07 (4th Cir. 1988).
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others determine it to mean where the product was
manufactured, while still others determine it to be where the
product caused damage.76 Given today’s complex commercial
environment and the pervasiveness of internet commerce,
determining the appropriate state’s law to apply under this
approach can be difficult in warranty cases because a product can
be manufactured in one state, sold in a second state, and give
rise to damage in a third state.
Consequently, the various outcomes under the alternatives
of section 2-318 coupled with the ambiguous test provided in the
UCC encourages disputes over the applicable state law that
waste time, money, and court resources.77 For example, in Mann
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the case turned upon which state’s
exceptions to privity applied.78 The plaintiffs, comprised of
eight fruit growers, sued the manufacturer of fruit boxes that
failed to hold the promised weight.79 The district court, applying
Nebraska law (Alternative A), dismissed the breach of warranty
claim for lack of privity, as the plaintiffs did not purchase the
boxes directly from the manufacturer.80 The plaintiffs appealed,
claiming that the district court should have applied Iowa law
(Alternative C), which would have permitted their claim.81
Although the distributor of the boxes placed the orders in Iowa
and the plaintiffs used the boxes in Iowa, the distributor and
manufacturer entered into the contract in Nebraska, the
manufacturer manufactured the boxes in Nebraska, and the
manufacturer would pay any judgment from funds from
Nebraska.82 Using the most significant contacts approach, the
court held that Nebraska law should apply and therefore
dismissed the breach of warranty claim for lack of privity.83

76

Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 886 F.2d 85, 90 (4th Cir. 1989).
See, e.g., Uppgren v. Exec. Aviation Servs., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md.
1971); Myers v. Council Mfg. Corp., 276 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Ark. 1967); Hardman v.
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 198 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Hill v. Clark Equip.
Co., 202 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972).
78
703 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1983).
79
Id. at 273.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 274.
82
Id.
83
Id.
77
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If the alternatives and the common law produced more
consistent results, plaintiffs and defendants would not need to
fight over the applicable state law as they did in Mann. With
over nineteen million incoming civil cases in state courts
each year, seventy percent of which relate to contract
claims, courts struggle to manage their caseloads.84 Eliminating
this unnecessary debate could save time, money, and other court
resources, as well as lead to more efficient dispute resolution for
the parties.
Ultimately, the inconsistencies created by section 2-318’s
alternatives and the diverging common law not only defeat the
purpose of the UCC, but also create economic inefficiency and
provide an incentive for parties to fight over which state’s law
applies to the transaction. The result is a provision that hinders
interstate commerce by weaving uncertainty, complexity, and
added expense into commercial transactions.
B.

Lack of Remedy

In certain circumstances, breach of warranty is the
appropriate mechanism for recovery of damages rather than
negligence or strict liability. However, section 2-318, with its
limitations on the type of damage recoverable by third parties,
removes certain remedies under a warranty claim that are
otherwise available to those parties under the UCC.
Often, a plaintiff cannot prove that the manufacturer
breached its duty of care or that the product was unreasonably
unsafe and therefore cannot recover damages caused by a
defective product under a negligence or strict liability theory.
Nevertheless, that plaintiff may still have a valid breach of
warranty claim.

84
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL – NATIONAL CASELOADS,
2009, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/StateCourt
CaseloadStatisticsFINAL.pdf. Federal courts are not immune from the problem
either. On average, parties waited as much as 25.3 months from the date of filing
until the claim went to trial in federal district courts, and the median wait time in
2011 was 24.8 months. Federal Court Management Statistics: District Courts—
STATES
COURTS,
September
2011,
UNITED
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManage
mentStatistics/2011/District%20FCMS%20Profiles%20September%202011.pdf&page
=1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
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For example, a plaintiff injured her arm when she rolled
her Ford SUV in an attempt to avoid a deer in the road.85 She
sued under theories of strict liability—alleging the SUV was
not reasonably safe—and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability—alleging that, due to its high rollover risk, the
SUV was not fit for its ordinary purpose of driving.86 The jury
decided that the plaintiff could not maintain a product liability
claim as the car was not unreasonably unsafe but that Ford
breached its warranty of merchantability.87
Ford appealed, arguing that if the SUV was not defective
under tort law, then Ford could not have breached its warranty
of merchantability.88 The appellate court upheld the jury’s
verdict, stating that it is possible for a warranty claim to survive
even when the tort claim failed.89 First, the court reasoned that
the two claims are independent of each other.90 Ruling them
codependent would result in abolishing the warranty of
merchantability.91 If the legislature had intended to abolish
warranty of merchantability, it would not have adopted
UCC § 2-314, which creates the implied warranty that goods are
“fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that description
are used.”92 Second, the court reasoned that the two claims rest
upon different meanings of the word “defect.”93 In breach of
warranty of merchantability, the SUV would be defective if it
was not fit for its ordinary purpose of driving, whereas in tort,
the SUV would be defective if it was unreasonably dangerous.94

85
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1994), certifying questions
to 87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1995).
86
Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 251–54, 662 N.E.2d 730, 731–33, 639
N.Y.S.2d 250, 251–53 (N.Y. 1995).
87
Denny, 42 F.3d at 110.
88
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 254–55, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
89
Id. at 254, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Interestingly, comment 7
of UCC section 2-314 states that a product that is merchantable under the UCC
cannot be defective under tort law: “[I]f goods are merchantable under warranty law,
can they still be defective under tort law, and if goods are not defective under tort
law, can they be unmerchantable under warranty law? The answer to both questions
should be no . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (2010).
90
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 255–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54.
91
Id. at 254–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54.
92
Id. at 255–56, 662 N.E.2d at 733–34, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253–54; U.C.C. § 2314(2)(c) (2010).
93
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 256–57, 662 N.E.2d at 734–35, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 254–55.
94
Id. at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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Accordingly, a plaintiff may have a viable breach of warranty
claim without a valid tort or strict liability claim. Nevertheless,
section 2-318—specifically Alternative A—often results in the
dismissal of that claim when the plaintiff is not the purchaser of
the product. In one instance, an employee became pinned
between a crane and a stone while working in a stone yard
attaching stones to a crane.95 He sued under both a negligence
theory—alleging restricted visibility and lack of warning device—
and a breach of warranty theory for his injuries.96
The
negligence theory failed, as the plaintiff was unable to prove that
the defendant breached its duty of care.97 The court held that the
restricted visibility of the crane was not a concealed danger, and
therefore the manufacturer had no duty to add a safety device.98
Despite the fact that the defendant did indeed breach its
warranty, the warranty claim also failed for lack of privity.99
Because the plaintiff was merely an employee of the purchaser
and did not purchase the crane, the employee had no privity to
the defendant.100 In the end, the plaintiff was uncompensated for
his injuries because all of his claims failed.
Even assuming the plaintiff could prove all of the elements of
negligence or strict liability, the economic loss doctrine may act
as a barrier to a claim for economic losses, leaving a plaintiff with
breach of warranty as the only viable claim. The economic loss
doctrine provides that a plaintiff cannot maintain a products
liability claim when the only damage is economic loss.101
Examples of economic loss include: (1) loss of product value;
(2) incidental damages such as inspection, transportation, and
storage costs incurred to replace the defective good; and

95
McCollum v. Grove Mfg. Co., 293 S.E.2d 632, 634 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d,
300 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1983).
96
Id. at 635–38.
97
Id. at 635.
98
Id. at 635–36.
99
Id. at 638.
100
Id.
101
E.g., Vt. Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 449 (D. Vt. 1993), aff’d,
79 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1996). For a discussion on whether the economic loss doctrine
should be abolished altogether, see generally Edward T. O’Donnell et al., On the
Differences Between Blood and Red Ink: A Second Look at the Policy Arguments for
the Abrogation of the Economic Loss Rule in Consumer Litigation, 19 NOVA L. REV.
923 (1995).
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(3) consequential damages such as lost profits.102 The theory
behind the economic loss doctrine is that contract law is better
suited to handle economic loss claims.103
Section 2-318 as currently drafted, however, fails to embrace
economic loss claims. Under Alternatives A and B, a court will
dismiss a breach of warranty claim by a third party when the
claim is only for economic loss, even if the end result is that the
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages.104 For instance, in
Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., a company sued the
manufacturer of rock crushing machines purchased through a
distributor.105 The machines repeatedly broke down over a twoyear period, allegedly causing over $400,000 in lost revenues and
other damages.106 The court denied the tort claim due to the
economic loss theory and the warranty claims due to lack of
privity.107 Despite motions from the plaintiff requesting that the
court allow the warranty claims to proceed regardless of privity
so that the plaintiff had some cause of action, the court refused to
ignore the privity requirement.108
In the end, the unfortunate result of section 2-318 for
plaintiffs is that the section often prevents an injured plaintiff
who possesses a valid breach of warranty claim from recovering
against a manufacturer when the plaintiff is not the purchaser or
when the plaintiff claims only economic loss.

102
Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Wis. 1998).
For a discussion of the differences between economic losses and non-economic losses,
see Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss
from Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2008).
103
See, e.g., Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003)
(“Originating in products liability cases, the economic loss doctrine requires that
contract law define the remedy when the loss is strictly economic, i.e., when no
damage occurs to persons or property other than the product in question. . . . ‘The
authorities recognize that the law of contracts is far better suited to deal with the
dissatisfaction on the part of a purchaser under such circumstances.’ ”) (quoting
Cont’l Ins. v. Page Eng’g Co., 783 P.2d 641, 647 (Wyo. 1989)); Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at
846.
104
Adirondack Combustion Techs., Inc. v. Unicontrol, Inc., 17 A.D.3d 825, 827,
793 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579 (3d Dep’t 2005); Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at 847.
105
Daanen, 573 N.W.2d at 843–44.
106
Id. at 844.
107
Id. at 847, 850.
108
Id. at 850.
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III. SIGNS OF CHANGE
Courts are seemingly dissatisfied with the current state of
section 2-318. Over the many years since the adoption of
alternatives in section 2-318, the case law interpreting and
applying section 2-318 has changed dramatically. Many courts
are expanding section 2-318 beyond its plain language and the
legislative intent in order to achieve fairness and to reflect the
current public policy attitude toward consumer protection. These
courts justify the expansion by relying on a phrase in the
comments to section 2-318: “[T]he section in this form is neutral
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law . . . .”109 Citing this language, one New York appellate court
stated that “[t]he Uniform Commercial Code has left the door
open to courts to extend the protection of warranty to greater
numbers of plaintiffs.”110
To illustrate the expansion of section 2-318 by courts, case
law varies as to whether a purchaser’s employee can sue for
breach of warranty. The word “employee” is excluded from the
language of Alternative A; therefore, many courts bar employees
in Alternative A jurisdictions from maintaining a breach of
warranty claim.111 Some courts, nonetheless, have extended
Alternative A to include employees of purchasers. The Supreme
Court of Maine, for instance, interpreted Alternative A to permit
a purchaser’s employee who was injured by a chipping machine

109

U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (2010).
Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 292, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719–20 (4th
Dep’t 1973).
111
See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822–23 (8th Cir. 1988);
Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991);
Bruns v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 605 N.E.2d 395, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). For a
detailed discussion of privity in relation to a purchaser’s employees, see Lauren
Fallick, Note, Are Employees “A” O.K.?: An Analysis of Jurisdictions Extending or
Denying Warranty Coverage to a Purchaser’s Employees Under Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-318, Alternative A, 29 NOVA L. REV. 721 (2005). Interestingly, the
proposed final draft of the original 1950 Uniform Commercial Code, which contained
only Alternative A, included language in its official comments specifically stating
that employees are covered under Alternative A; however, this language never made
it into the final version. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (proposed final draft 1950)
(“[E]mployees of an industrial consumer are covered and the policy of this Article
intends that neither the privity concept . . . nor any technical constructions of
‘employment’ shall defeat adequate protection under this section.”).
110
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to sue the seller of the machine for breach of warranty.112 The
court determined that an employee constitutes a family member
of a corporation and is therefore contemplated by Alternative A:
Indeed, in the present circumstances, it takes only the
attribution of a figurative bent to the word ‘family’ to bring
plaintiff, as an employee of a corporate ‘buyer’, within the policy
scope of Section 2-318 since plaintiff may be regarded as a
member of such ‘family’ as a corporation may reasonably be said
to have.113

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also came to the conclusion
that employees fall under Alternative A, but under a public
policy rationale.114 Rather than read “employee” into Alternative
A, the court held that the employee could maintain a breach of
warranty claim because it is against public policy to “permit[ ]
the manufacturer to place a defective article in the stream of
commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages caused by
the defect.”115
In another example of the judicial expansion of section 2-318,
some courts in Alternative A states have expanded the plaintiff
pool even further to include bystanders. To illustrate, in one case
a truck pulling a trailer was travelling down a road when the
hook attaching the trailer to the truck detached, causing the
trailer to collide with an oncoming car.116 The plaintiff, a

112
McNally v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 921 (Me. 1973). Note that in
1963, Maine adopted Alternative A of section 2-318. It was not until after this case
that Maine adopted its own version of section 2-318 rather than choose from one of
the alternatives. Id. at 921 n.9.
113
Id. This interpretation of Alternative A demonstrates how dissatisfied some
courts are with the limitations of the provision—so much so that they must stretch
the definition of “family member” to include employees.
114
Salvador v. Atl. Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907–08 (Pa. 1974).
115
Id. at 907. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also relied on public policy in
the lower court decision: “To apply the strict rule of privity against such an employee
as here, would mean that if the purchaser . . . had been a corporation then there
would never have been anyone to sue on the breach of warranty for personal injuries
because a corporation could hardly have a burned arm or a burned leg. . . . The
doctrine of privity should not be a shield against a breach of warranty action in a
case like the one here . . . .” Salvador v. I.H. English of Phila., Inc., 307 A.2d 398,
402–03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (quoting Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885,
893 (Ark. 1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Salvador v. Atl.
Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974).
116
Ciampichini v. Ring Bros., 40 A.D.2d 289, 290, 339 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (4th
Dep’t 1973).
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passenger in that car, brought a breach of warranty claim for
personal injuries against the seller of the hook.117 The court
concluded:
It is both reasonable and just to extend to bystanders the
protection against a defective manufactured article. To restrict
recovery to those who are users is unrealistic in view of the fact
that bystanders have less opportunity to detect any defect than
either purchasers or users. Our decision is one of policy but is
mandated by both justice and common sense.118

Courts are even expanding Alternatives A and B to cover
economic losses in circumstances where no other recovery
theories are available. For instance, in a federal court case in
Connecticut, a company sued the manufacturer and distributor of
an oil finish product for both property damage and lost profits.119
After using the finish, an employee for the company followed the
instructions on the label of the finish, which stated that any rags
used to apply the finish should be soaked with water and placed
outside to avoid spontaneous combustion.120 Despite the fact that
the employee followed the instructions, the plaintiff claimed that
the rags spontaneously combusted and caused a fire that burned
down a nearby building.121 The company was precluded from
bringing a product liability claim under the economic loss
doctrine, so it sought relief under the UCC.122 Although the
company had suffered only commercial losses, the court
permitted the warranty claims because the company’s “only
recourse [was] warranty under the UCC. If in fact the plaintiff
[had] suffered a loss redressable in warranty, it should [have
been] able to proceed under that theory absent another available
cause of action, despite the lack of privity with the defendants.”123
Ultimately, this shift in case law signals that a change is
needed in the underlying code to achieve fairness and align
section 2-318 with current public policy.

117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at 290, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 717–18.
Id. at 293, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Denwat Corp., 778 F. Supp. 592, 593 (D. Conn. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 596.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ALTERNATIVES
In order to mitigate the problems caused by the current
version of section 2-318 and to align the provision with the
common law, the drafters of the UCC should make two revisions
to section 2-318. First, the drafters should remove certain
language from comment 3 of section 2-318 to prevent courts from
relying on this language to expand section 2-318 beyond its
language and intent. While the drafters of the UCC intended for
courts to supplement its provisions, the drafters did not intend
for courts to supplant its provisions.124 Although courts are
moving in right direction—toward Alternative C—even this shift
technically was not within the drafters’ intent. Courts have been
expanding section 2-318 beyond the legislative intent by
justifying their actions with a phrase in comment 3 that reads:
“[T]he section in this form is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law . . . .”125 The drafters
intended comment 3 to discuss section 2-318’s neutrality with
respect to the ability of a purchaser to sue any party in the
distribution chain and nothing more.126 When that often-cited
phrase is read with the rest of the sentence, this intent is
apparent: “Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on
whether the seller’s warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
The
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”127
emphasized language highlights the drafters’ intent to allow
judicial expansion only with respect to a purchaser making a
breach of warranty claim within the distribution chain.
Therefore, courts erroneously use comment 3 to expand
section 2-318 when the claim involves a party outside of the
distribution chain. In order to avoid confusion and prevent the
unintended expansion of section 2-318, the drafters should revise
the comment to clarify that section 2-318 only applies to a
purchaser suing the manufacturer or other seller in the
distribution chain of the purchased product.

124
U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (2010) (“Therefore, while principles of common law and
equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they may not be
used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions
reflect . . . .”).
125
Id. § 2-318 cmt. 3; see supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
126
See Szajna v. Gen. Motors Corp., 503 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ill. 1986).
127
§ 2-318 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
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Second, while some courts have expanded Alternatives A and
B to closely resemble Alternative C, a divide among the states
exists that still needs correcting. Accordingly, the drafters of
section 2-318 should adopt only one provision rather than offer
three alternatives. The provision should resemble Alternative C
and extend a product’s warranty to any party reasonably
expected to use, consume, or be affected by the product for any
reasonably foreseeable damage without distinguishing between
personal injury, property damage, or economic loss.
The
provision should read as follows:
A seller’s warranty to an immediate buyer, whether express or
implied, a seller’s remedial promise to an immediate buyer, or a
seller’s obligation to a remote purchaser under Section 2-313A
or 2-313B extends to any person or entity that may reasonably
be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and
that is injured in person, property, or otherwise by the breach of
the warranty, remedial promise, or obligation. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty,
remedial promise, or obligation extends.

By adopting a provision reflective of current case law,
section 2-318 would create more uniformity and predictability,
minimize disputes over which state’s law should apply to the
transaction,128 and provide plaintiffs with a channel to bring
lawsuits even when no personal injury occurred.129 A single
provision, as opposed to three alternatives, reduces variations
among the states simply because there is only one provision—
regardless of its content. Moreover, because the provision would
permit the recovery of economic losses, it would repair the
current gap between tort law and contract law.
V.

ALL ABOARD

A majority of states, if not all, likely would adopt the
proposed provision as part of their commercial code with little to
no variation. The original need for alternatives created by the
128
The author acknowledges that there will always be battles over which state’s
law to apply to the transaction and that the proposal in this Article only addresses
conflicts of law caused by the non-uniformity of section 2-318.
129
W. Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980)
(“We therefore hold that a remote purchaser . . . is not foreclosed from bringing an
action to recover an economic loss . . . from a manufacturer . . . because of lack of
privity.”).
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differing views of liability is waning, as indicated by the current
case law. Courts, through their broad interpretation of the
alternatives in favor of plaintiffs, are signaling that the schism
among the states from fifty years ago does not exist any longer.130
Furthermore, the proposed provision provides greater
protection to consumers, which would be enticing to states in
today’s consumer-centric commercial society. Many consumerprotection laws exist at both the federal and state levels that aim
to shield consumers from unfair trade practices and unsafe
products.131 The proposal would similarly protect consumers
from manufacturers in three particular ways.
First, the provision would place the risk of loss on the
manufacturer, as the manufacturer is in a better position than
the consumer to absorb that risk. The Model of Precaution,
developed by Professor Robert Cooter, addresses the correlation
between compensating injured parties and minimizing social
costs by analyzing the relationship between “the direct cost of
harm and the cost of precautions against it.”132 According to the
Model of Precaution, the law should assign the risk to the party
who can: (1) bear the risk at a lower cost, or (2) take the best
precaution to lower the risk.133 In breach of warranty situations,
the manufacturer can bear the risk at the lowest cost and take
the best precautions to lower the risk, making it the appropriate
party to address the risks. As the producer of the product, the
manufacturer has a better understanding of the risk profile of
the product, its potential for defect, and the extent of damage it
can cause.134 This knowledge allows the manufacturer to more
efficiently protect itself through insurance and other riskmanagement options. Also, the manufacturer has the lower cost
of bearing the risk, as it can spread the risk among the cost
130

See supra notes 109–23 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006); Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006); Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2006); New Vehicle Buyer Proection Act,
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 380/1–8 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:18–19 (West
2011); Consumer Sales Practices Act, OHIO ADMIN. CODE 109:4-3-01 (2011).
132
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). While the primary goal of the UCC is to
make the aggrieved party whole, many of the recent revisions to the UCC also grant
remedies to injured parties in order to encourage or discourage certain behaviors.
Maggs, supra note 61, at 582.
133
Cooter, supra note 132, at 38.
134
See id. at 41, 43.
131
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of its product through cost accounting measures.135 Indeed,
the manufacturer’s experience and knowledge regarding the
potential risk of the product and its capability to bear the risk at
the lowest cost make the manufacturer the most logical party to
absorb the risk.
Second, placing the responsibility on the manufacturer
incentivizes it to produce a higher quality and safer product,
lessening the chance of a defect136 by encouraging caution,
testing, and quality control.137 Placing the risk of loss with the
manufacturer creates “incentives for efficient precaution.”138 In
other words, if the law places the risk with the manufacturer and
the precautionary measures are less expensive than paying
damages, then the manufacturer will take precautionary
measures to make a better quality product that has a lesser
chance of defect.139
Generally, it is more cost efficient to take precautionary
measures than to compensate for damages, as manufacturing one
defective product is equal to losing three defect-free products.140
Moreover, statistics bearing on six sigma141 effectiveness estimate
that the return on investment is anywhere from two to five
fold.142 Accordingly, placing the risk of loss on the manufacturer
should result in the manufacturer taking precautionary
measures to minimize damage caused by a defective product.
135

Id. at 38.
Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity
Requirement: Once More into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 13 (1987).
137
See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 157 & n.6 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 203 (emphasis omitted).
139
See id. at 50. Recall that economics assumes that corporations act to
maximize profits. Id. at 12; see also id. at 4.
140
Vijay Kumar, Use the 5V Approach To Increase Plant Efficiency, ISIXSIGMA,
http://www.isixsigma.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1581:use-the5v-approach-to-increase-plant-efficiency&Itemid=156 (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
141
Six sigma is a widely-used methodology developed by Motorola to improve
quality and prevent defects. See T.N. Goh, Six Triumphs and Six Tragedies of Six
Sigma, 22 Quality Engineering 299, 302 (2010. Six sigma is a five-step process
whereby a company: (i) defines the problem; (ii) measures the extent of the problem;
(iii) analyzes the problem to determine the root cause(s); (iv) improves the problem
by creating solutions to the cause(s); and (v) controls the implementation to ensure
effectiveness in solving the problem. Jason Mark Anderman, The Future of Contracts
Seen Through Six Sigma, 25 ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. DOCKET 40, 42 (2007).
142
Press Release, iSixSigma, ROI on Six Sigma Programs Directly Related to
Investment Size, Survey Shows (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.isixsigma.com/pressreleases/roi-six-sigma-programs-directly-related-investment-size-survey-shows/.
136
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Third, the provision allows plaintiffs to recover all
reasonable damages that they suffer. A provision that allows
recovery based upon the type of damage suffered by the plaintiff
defeats the underlying purpose of remedies under the UCC.
Remedies under the UCC aim to make the aggrieved party
whole; in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position
that plaintiff would have been if the product had not been
defective and caused damage.143 The purpose of a remedy should
not change depending upon the type of damages a plaintiff
sustains; it should simply compensate a plaintiff with money to
make the plaintiff as whole as possible. To allow recovery under
the UCC but not grant all of the damages typically available to a
plaintiff under the UCC is an inconsistency that should be
removed from section 2-318.
Moreover, distinguishing between personal injury and
economic loss is arbitrary and unjust. An economic loss can be
just as damaging, if not more damaging, than a personal
injury.144 As the District Court of Minnesota noted, it is simply
unjust “to allow a plaintiff who sustains personal injuries to
recover from a remote defendant while not allowing recovery to
those who suffer only economic loss” as “economic loss can be as
devastating as injury to one’s person.”145 In one example of this
injustice, a daughter purchased a Christmas tree that she placed
in her father’s home.146 At the time of purchase, an employee
represented that the tree was fire-retardant; however, the tree

143
Maggs, supra note 61, at 578 (noting that the “father of the UCC”, Karl
Llewellyn, specifically created provisions “that would focus on making the injured
party whole”); see also U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2010). For cases discussing this purpose
with respect to contract law in general, see In re Witte, 841 F.2d 804, 807 (7th Cir.
1988); First Nat’l State Bank of N.J. v. Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of
Norristown, 610 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Altrutech, Inc. v. Hooper Holmes, Inc., 6 F.
Supp. 2d 1269, 1273 (D. Kan. 1998); Martin v. Stiers, 165 F. Supp. 163, 167
(M.D.N.C. 1958) (“The general rule is that a party to a contract, who has been
injured by the breach, is entitled as compensation therefor to be placed, in so far as
this can be done by money, in the same position he would have occupied if the
contract had been performed, and where the breach of contract consists in
preventing its performance, the party injured, on proper proof, may recover the
profits he would have realized had the contract not been breached.”) (quoting
Chesson v. Kieckhefer Container Co., 1 S.E.2d 357, 358–59 (N.C. 1939)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 264 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1959).
144
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 153–56 (Cal. 1965) (Peters, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145
Indus. Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 804 (D. Minn. 1980).
146
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 244 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Minn. 1976).
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rapidly caught fire and caused significant damage to her father’s
house.147 The court permitted the recovery of the economic loss
despite lack of privity because “[t]he destruction of a home and
physical damage to personal property is no less an injury to one
who sustains them than a bodily injury.”148
Although this proposed revision expands both the plaintiff
pool and the types of damages recoverable under a breach of
warranty claim, both the provision and the UCC contain
limitations that provide safeguards for manufacturers against
unlimited and unforeseeable liability. First, the language of the
proposed provision only permits recovery of a plaintiff’s loss if
that plaintiff can be reasonably anticipated.149
Thus, the
proposal creates boundaries to the potential pool of plaintiffs to
whom the manufacturer would be liable.
Second, as the
manufacturer is generally the designer and the producer of the
product, it understands the potential for defect and damage in its
products. This manufacturing expertise creates predictability
of the potential for loss caused by product defect.150 Finally, the
UCC itself provides mechanisms that allow a manufacturer to
protect itself from loss.151 Section 2-316 allows sellers not only to
modify implied warranties, but to exclude them altogether.152
Even when implied warranties are mandatory under the

147
148
149

Id. at 107.
Id. at 110.
E.g., Rynders v. E.I. du Pont, de Nemours & Co., 21 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.

1994).
150

See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 252.
Indus. Graphics, Inc. v. Asahi Corp., 485 F. Supp. 793, 804 (D. Minn.
1980). The manufacturer is usually the party who ultimately pays in a breach of
warranty claim. Not only are manufacturers sued under the “deep pockets” theory,
manufacturers often have indemnification obligations to their distributors and
retailers.
152
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2010). While manufacturers have the option to exclude
certain warranties, customers may refuse to buy a product without a warranty. In
the end, manufacturers need to conduct a risk-benefit analysis in choosing whether
to exclude a warranty to avoid liability. Karl Llewellyn believed that offering a
warranty is in the best interest of a seller: “[R]epeat orders are what a seller needs;
to stand behind words, and even behind wares-without-words, is good business for
the seller . . . .” K. N. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COLUM. L.
REV. 699, 721 (1936). Indeed, over eighty years after Llewellyn’s article, companies
still recognize that it is good business to offer warranties. Toyota, for example, is
looking to add additional warranties to improve its image after the rash of recent
recalls. Toyota May Increase Incentives, Warranty To Improve Image, MERINEWS
(Feb. 15, 2010, 1:30), http://www.merinews.com/article/toyota-may-increaseincentives-warranty-to-improve-image/15798078.html (citizen journal).
151
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Magnuson-Moss Act, a federal warranty law, the seller
nonetheless can limit the duration of those warranties.153 A
party—whether the purchaser or a third party—can claim breach
of warranty only to the extent that the warranty is offered by the
manufacturer and is still valid.154 As stated by one court, “[i]t is
axiomatic that a remote plaintiff, or any plaintiff for that matter,
cannot enforce a nonexistent warranty.”155
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the UCC should replace the alternatives of
section 2-318 with one provision that excludes all reasonably
foreseeable parties from the privity requirement for all
reasonable damages in order to harmonize the section with both
jurisprudence and the current trends in consumer protection.
This revision eliminates the problems with current section 2-318
by creating more uniformity and predictability, avoiding battles
over applicable state law, and providing plaintiffs a cause of
action under which to sue when no personal injury had occurred.
Furthermore, the replacement of the alternatives with a
provision similar to Alternative C is appropriate, as it allocates
risk of loss to the party best able to minimize that risk and
provides all remedies typically available under the UCC, while
providing manufacturers and other sellers protection against
unforeseen and unpredictable liability.
In the end, if the goal of the UCC truly is “to simplify,
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions . . . [and] to make uniform the law,”156 then the
drafters of the UCC should replace section 2-318 with one
provision in line with the well-developed common law.

153

15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2006); id. § 2308(a) (requiring the seller of consumer
products to provide implied warranties if the seller chooses to provide a written
warranty).
154
See Rynders, 21 F.3d at 839 (“They are mistaken, however, in their
contention that the modification or exclusion of warranties between the buyer and
the seller has no effect on third-party beneficiaries to the contract.”); Heritage Res.,
Inc. v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 774 N.W.2d 332, 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
155
Heritage, 774 N.W.2d at 343.
156
U.C.C. § 1-103(a).

